

Please check the examination details below before entering your candidate information

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| Candidate surname |  |  |  |  | Other names      |  |  |  |  |
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**Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level**

**Thursday 11 June 2026**

Morning (Time: 2 hours)

Paper reference **WHI04/1D**

**History**

**International Advanced**

**PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations**

**Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90**

**You must have:**  
Extracts Booklet (enclosed)

Total Marks

## Instructions

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and **ONE** question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided  
– *there may be more space than you need.*

## Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets  
– *use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.*

## Advice

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ►

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## SECTION A

**Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.**

**Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.**

- 1** How far do you agree with the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was made because it was feared that South Korea could soon become too strong to be attacked successfully?

Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the issues related to this controversy.

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(Total for Question 1 = 25 marks)

**TOTAL FOR SECTION A = 25 MARKS**



## SECTION B

Answer ONE question in Section B.

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

### EITHER

- 2 How far do you agree that the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in Malaysia (1948–60) was due to the weaknesses of the Communists rather than the strengths of the British?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

### OR

- 3 How accurate is it to say that the impact of the Tet Offensive (1968) was wholly disastrous for the US war effort in Vietnam?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)

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**TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS**



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# Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level

**Thursday 11 June 2026**

Morning (Time: 2 hours)

Paper  
reference

**WHI04/1D**

## **History**

**International Advanced**

**PAPER 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations**

**Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90**

### **Extracts Booklet**

**Do not return this Booklet with the question paper.**

*Turn over* ►

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### Extracts for use with Section A.

**Extract 1:** From R Leckie, *Conflict: The History of the Korean War 1950–1953*, published in 1996.

The summer of 1950 offered Stalin perhaps the last chance to unify Korea under the communist leadership of Kim Il Sung. The American-supported republic in the South had begun to show alarming signs of gaining real strength. South Korea was making economic gains and had withstood all attempts at political subversion. Communist guerrilla activity in the south was also slowing down. The South Korean Army (ROK) had made enough progress for a US Army General to make the public claim that the ROK was 'the best shooting army outside the United States.'

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South Korea was beginning to get rid of some of the political features that made it so unpopular with its critics in the West. Most notable were indications that some of the broad powers, which Syngman Rhee had abused in his use of police-state tactics, were to be taken away from the presidency. In the elections of May 1950, 110 independent politicians won seats in the National Assembly. A shift in American opinion could bring real military help to South Korea. If North Korea waited much longer, a true strong democracy might stand on the borders of Communist Asia.

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So, the decision to invade South Korea was made.



**Extract 2:** From M Hickey, *The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism 1950–1953*, published in 1999.

Government planners in North Korea were almost certainly tempted into the attack on South Korea in June 1950. This was because they misread the attitude of the United States Government to the foreign policy situation in the Korean peninsula. It seemed that the Americans had reluctantly accepted the communist victory in China. It also seemed from the comments made by numerous important people in the US, and particularly now that American troops had been withdrawn, that the US would also accept the control of South Korea by communist forces. On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made his notorious National Press Club speech in Washington defining American Far Eastern Policy. He indicated that there was no longer an intention from the US to guarantee the security of any areas on the Asiatic mainland from military attack.

Kim Il Sung, encouraged by the situation, presented his plans to Stalin. At first Stalin held back, knowing that it would be fatal to risk all-out war with the US until the Soviet nuclear weapon was fully ready. However, now that American troops had left Korea, Stalin felt safe in giving his approval for an invasion.

There was only the poorly-rated South Korean Army to deal with. The South Korean Army was not in a position to offer much more than token military resistance in the summer of 1950, despite optimistic claims from senior officers.

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**Acknowledgements:**

**Extract 1 from:** Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950–1953 by Robert Leckie © Da Capo Press, 1996

**Extract 2 from:** The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism 1950–1953 by Michael Hickey © John Murray, May 1999

