



Mark Scheme (Results)

Summer 2026

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level in
History (WHI04/1D)

Paper 4: International Study with Historical
Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–
90

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

Section A

Targets: **A01 (5 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

A03 (20 marks): Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate.• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts.• Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.
2	5–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate.• Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included.• A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.
3	9–14	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences.• Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts.• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.
4	15–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them.• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge.• Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.
5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors.• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments.• A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.

Section B

Target: AO1 (25 marks): Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	1–4	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic.• Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question.• The overall judgement is missing or asserted.• There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	5–8	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question.• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question.• An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit.• The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	9–14	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included.• Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth.• Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation.• The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.
4	15–20	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period.• Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands.• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported.• The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.
5	21–25	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period.• Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands.• Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement.• The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
1	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument.</p> <p>Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was made because it was feared that South Korea could soon become too strong to be attacked successfully.</p> <p>In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <p>Extract 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The summer of 1950 was looking as if it was Stalin's last opportunity to bring North and South Korea together under Communist rule, as South Korea was beginning to establish itself• South Korea was developing economically and had overcome attempts to destabilise its politics. Political reforms were taking place that would make it more democratic• South Korea was becoming more secure militarily with a decrease in Communist guerrilla activity and a well-trained army• South Korea's political reforms might encourage the USA to support it militarily if threatened. <p>Extract 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• North Korean officials were enticed into planning an invasion of South Korea because they misunderstood the mindset of the government in the USA about the situation in Korea• The US government had given the impression that, having albeit reluctantly accepted a communist regime in China, they were willing to accept a communist take-over of South Korea• North Korea believed that the US Secretary of State had made it clear in a speech in January 1950 that the US was no longer willing to militarily uphold the security of South Korea• The military weakness of South Korea persuaded a previously-reluctant Stalin to agree to a plan for North Korea to invade South Korea; US troops had left the Korean Peninsula and the ROK army was too weak to resist. <p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was made because it was feared that South Korea could soon become too strong to be attacked successfully. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Stalin was in a good position to take advantage of South Korean weaknesses before it was too late; he had the atom bomb, the Sino-Soviet Pact had been signed and the US was redefining its Far East policy• Syngman Rhee's arbitrary use of power against his critics and in dealing with communist insurgents had led to lukewarm support for him from the West. Political reform in 1950 began to reinvigorate Western interest• Truman's reluctance to guarantee South Korean security was based on US Congress dislike of Syngman Rhee; the multi-party nature of the May 1950 elections in South Korea could have potentially reversed this• Communist guerrilla activity in the South had made little headway in gaining strategic success or popular support and Kim Il Sung had come to believe that invasion was the only option.

Question	Indicative content
	<p>Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was made because it was feared that South Korea could soon become too strong to be attacked successfully. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The cumulative effect of the US government and US politicians during 1950, suggesting that Korea was of no great importance to US foreign policy, caused Kim Il Sung to lobby Stalin to underwrite an invasion • The South Korean Army was in a very weak position; they were poorly trained and without regular supplies of up-to-date weaponry. There were no US troops in South Korea. • North Korea wrongly believed the US would not come to the aid of South Korea. Despite public statements, the US government was committed to 'containment' and Truman was not willing to be seen to 'lose South Korea' • The decision to invade South Korea was based on its growing weaknesses; it seemed reliant on its own army for security, international support from the West was limited and the May elections were divisive.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 1A: The Making of Modern Europe, 1805–71

Question	Indicative content
2	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in Malaysia (1948-60) was due to the weaknesses of the Communists rather than the strengths of the British.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in Malaysia (1948-60) was due to the weaknesses of the Communists should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The size of the Communist guerrilla force was small from the start and at its height in 1951 could only muster c7-8000 active combatants• The Communist guerrilla forces were operating in a geography of islands, with only a single land border with Thailand, making access to weapons and supplies from outside difficult• The Communist guerrilla forces were not tangibly supported with weapons or training from Communist governments elsewhere in the world• Unlike in other Asian post-war colonies, the Communist movement was not able successfully to harness a nationalist cause, as the guerrillas were mainly recruited from the minority ethnic Chinese community• The Communists lacked sufficient civilian support to be able to use guerrilla warfare to cripple the British response. Estimates suggest that there were c1 million sympathisers from a population of c6 million. <p>Arguments and evidence that the failure of the Communist guerrilla movement in Malaysia (1948-60) was due to the strengths of the British should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The British responded to the Malayan 'Emergency' with speed. Draconian security measures were brought in and British troop numbers increased, using National Service conscripts with some jungle warfare training• The appointment of General Sir Gerald Templar in early 1952, as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, made possible an effective co-ordinated response combining political and military organisation• The British policy of purposefully exploiting divisions between the Malay and Chinese communities and establishing a credible 'hearts and minds policy', e.g. the building of new villages, undermined the Communists• The British were willing to mobilise the Malay population to fight against the Communist guerrillas, e.g. increasing the number of Malay soldiers, organising a Home Guard, encouraging an intelligence network to evolve• The British made realistic promises to advance the process of independence from British colonial rule should the Communist guerrilla action be defeated. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>

Question	Indicative content
3	<p>Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant.</p> <p>Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the accuracy of the statement that the impact of the Tet Offensive (1968) was wholly disastrous for the US war effort in Vietnam.</p> <p>Arguments and evidence that the impact of the Tet Offensive (1968) was wholly disastrous for the US war effort in Vietnam should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Tet Offensive was a psychological disaster for the US war effort in Vietnam; the images of Vietcong combatants in the grounds of the US Embassy persuaded many Americans that the US was losing the war • News coverage of the Tet Offensive, particularly the 'Cronkite effect', created an atmosphere of public uncertainty over previous US government claims of success and impacted directly on US policy decisions in Vietnam • There was a growth in public protest against the Vietnam War after February 1968 that increasingly negatively affected the attitude of draftees to fighting in the war and the morale of those already fighting • Growth in support for the anti-war movement meant that neither politicians nor military commanders could ignore the negative atmosphere; army requests for 200 000 more men were not followed up • The reaction to the Tet Offensive in the US appeared to encourage the Communists to believe that they were winning the propaganda battle in Vietnam and to continue their military efforts despite the overall defeat • After the Tet Offensive, US politicians, both Democrat and Republican, effectively accepted that a move towards a policy of negotiated withdrawal rather than continued military action was the way forward. <p>Arguments and evidence that the impact of the Tet Offensive (1968) was not wholly disastrous for the US war effort in Vietnam should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Tet Offensive was a military failure for the Communists fighting in South Vietnam, particularly the Vietcong. The Vietcong lost c58 000 combatants while the US and ARVN combined lost c6 000 combatants • Strategically, the Communist war effort was now more reliant on the soldiers of the North Vietnamese Army than on the Vietcong guerrillas, allowing the US to deploy the more successful strategy of 'clear and hold' • The US regained all territory taken early in the Tet Offensive; the impetus from this, and the weakening of Vietcong numbers, led to new tactics that brought 50% of South Vietnam back under control by the end of 1969 • The increasing onus on the North Vietnamese Army after the Offensive meant that North Vietnam was more willing to engage in diplomacy and was probably influential on the opening up of secret talks with Kissinger • Opinion polls showed that the majority of the American public still supported US involvement in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. <p>Other relevant material must be credited.</p>